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On Knowing One's Own Actions1
1. Introduction 
Given the recent debates about self-knowledge and first-person authority it is 
surprising that there has not been more discussion about our knowledge of our 
actions.2 It is surprising because our knowledge of our own actions seems, prima 
facie, to share many of the features of our knowledge of beliefs and perceptions, that 
have given rise to these debates.3 At least this is what I want to suggest in this chapter. 
Indeed, perhaps the main motivation for this chapter is to place discussion of our 
knowledge of our own actions firmly alongside our knowledge of other psychological 
phenomena. I will outline what seem to be intuitively plausible features of our 
knowledge of our actions, and consider what account we might give of such 
knowledge that respects those features. A suggestion as to what form an account of 
our knowledge of our actions should take will be offered.  
 
These tasks will constitute the explicit content of the chapter. However, it is also my 
hope that discussion of the knowledge we have of our own actions will serve some 
further aims. I hope it will serve to extend the range of possible sources for self-
knowledge. By 'self-knowledge' I mean not just knowledge of that thing which is in 
fact the knower, but knowledge of ourselves as ourselves. The account sketched here 
promises to give us a way of knowing of our own actions that is unavailable to anyone 
other than the acting subject.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper was mostly written during leave taken under the Research Leave Scheme of the Arts and 
Humanities Research Board. I am very grateful to them. I have benefited from very useful comments 
from participants of meetings in Fribourg, Girona, Manchester and Warwick (the latter in a seminar 
arranged as part of the AHRB Project in Consciousness and Self-Consciousness). Special thanks to the 
participants in a graduate research seminar on self-knowledge at UCL, and for comments to Alan 
Brown, David Levy, Paul Noordhof, Mark Sacks, Barry Smith and an anonymous referee for this 
volume. Particular thanks are due to the editors for their comments, interest and patience. 
2 There was a flurry of papers on the subject in the early sixties. See O'Shaughnessy (1963); Anscombe 
(1963); Donnellan (1963); Broadie (1967); Olsen (1969); Danto (1963). Since then there has been 
Velleman's important discussion in his Practical Reflection. It was only after writing this paper that I 
came across Johannes Roessler's valuable contribution to this issue. See Roessler (this volume).  
3 See Cassam (ed.) (1994), C. MacDonald, B. Smith & C. Wright  (1998) and Shoemaker (1996) 
as key sources for the work that constitutes these debates. 
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An assumption that forms part of the background to this chapter is the assumption that 
actions are as primitive a psychological phenomenon as beliefs and perceptions.4 And 
it aims to consider what account we should give of our actions so understood. In 
doing this, the chapter aims to take its place in a move away from a general passivism 
about the psychological, a move away from the idea that the basic case of a mental 
phenomenon is a mental state or disposition. A Martian reader of contemporary 
philosophy of mind would be quite likely to think that we do not really believe that 
we judge or act. Or at least she would think that we understand such things as 
psychologically non-basic: as structured groups of more basic psychological, and 
possibly non-psychological, states. While there are many who claim themselves to be 
non-reductivist about psychological phenomenon, the reduction or elimination of 
mental activity in favour of mental passivity is in fact widespread.  
 
2. Features of our knowledge of our own actions. 
Let us consider a simple case of action. I want to catch my friend's attention and I 
raise my arm in order to do so. Now consider my knowledge of my action of raising 
my arm. Intuitively, such knowledge is puzzlingly easy to come by. I seem to know 
directly and authoritatively that I am voluntarily raising my arm in a way that I do not 
know others' actions directly and authoritatively. Further, when I know that I am 
raising my arm, I seem to know it no later than when I have started to raise it. In 
particular, I do not seem to have to await perceptual information, for example, that 
muscles are contracting and that my arm is rising in order to know it. Also, wanting to 
know what I am doing seems to be all that is required in order for me, in normal 
cases, to know what I am doing. If I wonder what I am doing when I am raising my 
arm, I seem to be immediately supplied with an answer. My knowledge of what I am 
doing seems, normally, to be immediately available given that I am acting. Let us 
separate these features of our knowledge of our action under three headings and say 
that intuitively our knowledge of our actions appears to be:  
First person authoritative: An agent seems to be authoritative over her own actions, 
and in a way that she is not over other's actions.  
                                                 
4 I argue elsewhere that we should take bodily actions as prime and as not amenable to reductive 
analysis in terms of intentions and bodily movements. Although no reductive analysis of actions is 
available a more modest account of actions is.  
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Relatively a priori. Our knowledge of our actions appears to be spontaneous and to be 
given immediately upon acting. It does not seem to require any investigation or to be 
based on evidence. 
Relatively transparent or self-intimating. Our actions, like other psychological 
phenomena seem to have a certain conditional epistemic availability to us. It does not 
seem to be the case that all our actions could as a matter of brute fact be beyond our 
ken. 
 
Let us go through these features in a bit more detail: 
Authoritive: I am going to take first-person authority with respect to a given subject 
area to imply that there is the possibility of an epistemic first/third-person asymmetry 
with respect to that area. Here the asymmetry must be taken to lie not simply in the 
fact that the subject can in central cases know more or better than others, with respect 
to that area, because they are around a lot or are more interested. Rather, the subject 
can know more or better because they know in a way which is in principle unavailable 
to others. So let us say:  
 
X is first person authoritative with respect to a fact, p, about X iff in central 
cases of X's judgements concerning p, we can say that X is in a better position 
than others to know p, because X knows p in a way in principle unavailable to 
others. 
 
Given this understanding of first-person authority it is, I think, plausible to claim that 
we are authoritative with respect to our actions. This authority is exemplified by the 
fact that when a subject acts, and so moves their body, we take the subject to be 
authoritative relative to others, about whether the subject acted in so moving or not. 
Consider the case where I intentionally raise my arm. Given that there is an action of 
me raising my arm, it will almost always be the case that I am able to know that I 
raised it, and know in a way that others do not. Others will look to me to know 
whether I raised my arm voluntarily. If I tell them that it was a voluntary act on my 
part, and not an involuntary, unwilled, movement they will presume me to be right. Of 
course, it is possible that I am deluding myself. It is also possible that I fail to be 
sincere and have reasons for wanting the person to think that, contrary to the facts, I 
acted voluntarily. However, for the main, and in the normal case, it will be presumed 
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that I am in a better position to say when I am acting, and when I am not, than they 
are. We might not take a subject as authoritative about her action described as a 
movement of her body. However, as long as we keep clear the distinction between 
authority with respect to movements of the body (arm risings), and authority with 
respect to actions (arm raisings), then it is clear that there is a first/third person 
asymmetry with respect to the latter.5
 
Let me emphasize that on this understanding, first-person authority with respect to our 
own actions does not mean that it is not possible for us to be wrong about whether we 
acted, and that another cannot be better position than me to know whether I acted. 
 
We are not infallible with regard to our actions and can clearly think that we acted 
while having failed − due to some motor failure, say − to do so. On an occasion where 
such a thing occurs another may be in a position to put me right. But note that we 
have here a parallel with perception, and possibly belief. We claim a first-person 
authority with respect to our own perceptions, and beliefs, even though we can think 
that we are perceiving something or having belief about something when we are not.  
 
Further, given the possibility of self-deception and unconscious action, we might fail 
to know that we are acting when we are. In such cases, another subject who sees us 
moving may be better able than us to know that we are acting. My deep desire to 
catch someone's attention may result in my voluntarily dropping my handkerchief, but 
the desire may be a sufficiently uncomfortable one for me to entirely disavow the 
action, and for me to think that it was involuntary.  
 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that given certain background conditions which we are 
entitled to take as met − such as that the subject’s body is functioning normally or that 
there are no special repressive mechanisms in place − we can assume a first-person 
and third person asymmetry over the question of whether the subject acted. 
 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that given bodily awareness – kinaesthesia in particular – it might be thought that 
we also have first person authority about whether our bodies moved. It seems to me that the nature of 
the authority attached to such cases is complex and is weaker than the phenomenon identified, but I 
will not discuss it further here. 
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Authority with respect to knowing that I acted vs. knowing what I did. 
Let us suppose that it is agreed that we do seem to know that we have acted in a way 
that is in principle unavailable to others, and agreed that this seems to give us a 
certain kind of epistemic authority over our actions. It may nevertheless be said that 
this does not give me authority over what I have done. To know that, it may be said, I 
have to have recourse to my perceptual faculties. And if my knowledge of what I have 
done is grounded in perception, then any first/third-person asymmetry in my 
knowledge of what I have done will be due to the fact that only I have perceptual 
access through bodily awareness to the activities of my own body. It will not be 
special to action, but rather will be a feature of my knowledge of bodily movement 
more generally. 
 
Well, I can clearly be ignorant, relative to others, about many of the things I have 
done. The tendency to describe our actions in terms of their effects − effects that may 
well be unknown to us − means that we very often can be said not to know what we 
have done. Given that actions can be described in terms of their consequences, and 
given that I can be ignorant of the consequences of my actions, I can be ignorant of 
my actions under such descriptions. It is perhaps mainly for this reason that we 
overlook the authority that we have over own actions.6 So, it is important to admit that 
I did not seem to have any special authority about what I did when what I did comes 
under the description of unintended consequences. However, it does not follow from 
this that I did not have any authority about what I did relative to descriptions which 
are more basic. If there are descriptions of actions which are somehow basic, we can 
make our claim a claim about our authority over our basic actions. 
 
One suggestion might be that if we take intentions and/or tryings as necessary for 
action, then there will always be a description of my actions in terms of what I 
                                                 
6 Physical actions are not the only psychological phenomena we describe in terms of their 
consequences. We ascribe mental actions in terms of their consequences – we say things like ‘Your 
decision not to go to the party was a decision not to meet NN’ even when the subject being addressed 
does not know NN or that NN was to be at the party. Note that in a not dissimilar, but in a much more 
restricted way, we ascribe people beliefs in terms of their implications or pre-suppositions. ('Your 
belief that women are foolish is a belief that your own daughter is foolish', 'Your belief that water is 
wet is a belief that H2O is wet', for example.) Perhaps, the way we very often re-describe the objects of 
perception, beyond any capacity the viewer has to recognize the objects as falling under those 
descriptions, comes closest to the action case. ('He was looking at a genuine Goya, priced at ten pounds 
and did not buy it'.) 
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intended or tried to do, and that description may be thought basic, relative to other 
descriptions. And, it may be said, I do seem to be authoritative about what I have 
done, when what I have done is described under the description drawn from what I 
intended or tried to do.  
 
However, things are more complex than this suggests. Our intentions and our tryings 
can also appear to fall under competing descriptions. So we can say: 'You think you 
are intending/trying to ring the door bell of no. 6, but you are not, that’s no. 4’s bell 
you are intending/trying to ring'.7 Perhaps we should think of these as de re 
ascriptions the truth of which like de re belief ascriptions, often transcend our 
capacity to accept them as true. The claim could then be that the statement of 
authority should be taken to be utilizing de dicto ascriptions. 
 
I do not think that this is the right way to go. First, it is far from obvious that 
intentions or tryings, as causal precursors, are necessary for actions. It is possible, and 
in my view plausible, to hold that that there can be deliberate actions which are not 
preceded by any intention to act. One might think that intentions should be understood 
as effective ways of storing conclusions of practical reasoning for the future, which 
are not needed in cases where an action itself is the conclusion of an exercise of 
practical reason. It is also possible to deny that we try to act whenever we act, even 
when we succeed in acting. One might think that tryings to act are kinds of degenerate 
or failed actions. Settling these questions falls beyond anything that can be 
accomplished here, but their openness raises a concern with the suggestion mooted. 
 
Second, it is implausible to say that I am in general authoritative with respect to my 
actions when those actions are described in terms of what I de dicto intended or tried 
to do. Consider a subject intending or trying to get a ball in the corner pocket in a 
game of snooker. Suppose that the subject acknowledges that this is the right way to 
describe what they are intending or trying to do. Imagine they strike the ball and the 
ball rolls into the corner pocket. While we do want to say that the subject is 
authoritative about whether they acted, it seems implausible to claim that the subject 
                                                 
7 The example comes from O'Shaughnessy (1980, Vol 2, p.85.) 
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is authoritative, in contrast to others, about whether they are getting the ball in the 
corner pocket.  
 
The trouble with descriptions in terms of what a subject is intending or trying to do is 
that they seem to avert to the subject's main purpose or motive in doing what they are 
doing. It seems, however, that while the subject will also be authoritative about what 
her purpose in acting is, and authoritative about the fact that she is acting for the 
purpose of doing one thing rather than another, she may not be authoritative about 
whether her purpose came off. 
 
Consider, in contrast, a subject's relation to her basic actions. Basic actions are those 
actions a subject can carry out directly, without having to do anything else; they are 
the actions that a subject needs to do in order to do anything else. I think it is plausible 
to suppose that the descriptions which correspond to a subject's basic actions will be 
descriptions in terms of bodily movements, and so plausible to suppose that the 
subject is authoritative with respect to bodily movement descriptions such as 'raising 
my arm' or 'lifting my foot'. I am, however, not going to aim to settle here the question 
of exactly which actions are basic actions. The point I want to urge here is that, 
whichever actions we think are basic actions, we are justified in supposing that an 
agent will have a grasp of the possible ways in which they are able to act directly. For, 
if an agent had no such grasp of the possible ways that they could act directly, it is 
hard to see what sense we could make of the agent determining to act in one way, 
rather than another, in order to realize their aims. Given that the ability to carry out a 
basic action is presupposed by the ability to carry out any action, we then are justified 
in supposing that it is a precondition of any action that an agent has a grasp of the 
possible ways they can act, which are in this way basic. If the above is right, then I 
think we have some way of seeing how it could be that an agent can be first-person 
authoritative not only about the fact that they have acted but also about what they 
have done. The suggestion is that knowledge of what one is doing, and not just 
knowledge that one is acting, comes from my acting against a grasp of possible things 
I could have done as basic actions. It is my opting to carry out this basic action, rather 
than that, which, assuming I have the requisite concepts, will give me the description 
under which I am authoritative with respect to the action. Further, although I may be 
authoritative with respect to a basic action ϕ, and I may intend or try to do φ by doing 
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ϕ, it will not follow that I am authoritative with respect to my actions φ.  It will not 
follow, because I may not be authoritative about whether by doing ϕ I succeeded in 
doing φ. So, while I might intend to pot the snooker ball by moving my arm forward, I 
can be authoritative about whether I moved my arm, without being authoritative about 
whether I potted the ball.8
 
In summary, it seems hard to deny that we are authoritative relative to others about 
the fact that we have acted when we have. But, I have suggested, we also have reason 
to think that there is an important asymmetry relative to others in our way of knowing 
what we have done. Given that prior to any action we must have a grasp of the 
possible basic ways that we might act, and given that we choose to act in one way 
rather than another, relative to that grasp, then we seem have the materials to account 
for a way of knowing what we have done that could not be available to anyone other 
than the agent, and which does not call on our perceptual faculties to provide 
immediate grounds. So, if this picture is right, the suggestion that a subject who acts is 
authoritative relative to others about their actions – both in terms of what we have 
done and of whether we have acted – becomes compelling. Further, if this picture is 
right, we have some explanation for the second feature identified above of our 
knowledge of our actions. 
 
Relatively a priori: Perhaps the most notable and problematic feature of our 
knowledge of our own actions is that it appears to be immediately available to the 
subject who is engaged in acting, and who is aiming to answer the question as to 
whether they are acting. Such knowledge does not seem to have to await the 
testimony of our perceptual faculties.9 We do not seem to need to feel our muscles 
clenching and our arm rising, or to see the trajectory of our hand, in order to know 
what we are doing. Perceptual knowledge is, without doubt, required as part of the 
background that makes action possible. However, it seems that in order to know what 
we are doing in the case of an individual action we do not need to perceive 
                                                 
8 Note that we have here a close parallel with our authority over our perceptions. I know authoritatively 
that I am seeing, and I know what I am seeing, but my authority over the latter seems only to extend to 
descriptions in terms of basic observational concepts. 
9 Pace Anscombe I do not think we need to think of knowledge of our bodies through bodily awareness 
as non-perceptual. I therefore mean to include bodily awareness among those sources not directly 
necessary for knowledge of what we are doing.  
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simultaneously, either via bodily awareness or our other five senses, what we are 
doing.10 In this way, our knowledge of our action is relatively a priori: that is, it is not 
acquired, or justified, via perceptual evidence in a given case, although it does rest on 
the obtaining of background conditions which we are entitled to take as met, and 
which themselves may garner support from perceptual information.  
 
Relatively transparent: It is not just that I do not seem to have to perceive that I am 
acting in order to know that I am acting, nor just that I am authoritative when I do 
judge that I am acting. Also the subject’s actions, like other psychological 
phenomena, seem to have a certain conditional epistemic availability to the judging 
subject. We can obviously fail to know that we are acting, as when we are acting 
absentmindedly or are repressing what we are doing. But, it does not seem to be the 
case that our actions can be, as a matter of brute fact, beyond our ken. It is, I think, 
very hard for us to imagine an agent who is capable of asking themselves the question 
‘What am I doing?’ not being able normally to answer the question correctly. This 
would be to imagine agent capable of reflexive thought, voluntarily carrying out one 
action, rather than another, and yet not knowing that they are acting. It seems to me, 
however, that we cannot, in Shoemaker’s phrase, envisage a creature who is simply 
self-blind with respect to all their actions in this way. There seems rather to be a 
necessary and conceptual connection between a subject acting and its knowing what it 
is doing.11
 
There are two different kinds of action, which perhaps ought to be separated here. 
Many have argued that we need to distinguish non-intentional actions – actions done 
for no reason – from intentional actions. If there is such a distinction then we might 
imagine that while our intentional actions are likely to prove accessible to us in the 
                                                 
10 Experimental psychological data tends to confirm this in so far as it finds that subjects judge 
themselves to be acting before their bodies can be observed to be moving. If they had to observe the 
movements of their bodies in order to ground their judgements we would expect their judgements to 
come much later. 
11 This connection is noted by Olsen (1969) and Broadie (1997). Note that someone who denied that 
our knowledge of our actions was relatively a priori might still accept that they must be relatively 
transparent. They might hold that it is a condition of something's being an action that it be generally 
known to the agent, but hold that our actions are known to us on the basis of perceptual information. 
They would then have to say that when the subject is blind to their movements, their movements 
cannot be actions.  
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way characterized, our non-intentional ones may not.12 Let us count absent-minded 
finger tappings as non-intentional actions of mine. Am I epistemologically 
disassociated with such actions to a degree that makes the claim that I could be totally 
self-blind with respect to them look plausible? It is clearly true that I can be tapping 
my fingers without noticing. However, to the extent that it is plausible that there is 
genuine agency in such cases, by which I mean that I can be said to be controlling the 
action, I must normally be able to come to know what I am doing. (And note that it is 
far from clear that it is plausible that we have genuine agency in such cases, rather 
than just that my body is caused to move by a purposive system I am not responsible 
for.) Consider a case where a subject is acting – counting using the fingers of her right 
hand, say – and then acts in a way incompatible with carrying on doing the former – 
picking up her cup of tea with her right hand, say. If we want to say that the subject 
herself is genuinely controlling both actions, rather than that some sub-personal 
system is, we want to explain how the second action relates to the former in the case 
were the subject is supposed to have no possibility of accessing the former. If there 
were a general disassociation for the subject between the perspective from which the 
question ‘what am I doing?’ gets answered, and the perspective from which she 
carries out her actions, we would have the possibility of a subject deciding to pick up 
her cup of tea wondering if her action could bring to an end or disrupt, or indeed be 
disrupted by, other actions she was unaware of carrying out. But turning the subject’s 
actions into possible external impositions in this way seems to get things quite wrong. 
If what I am doing can be said to be controlled by me, I must at least have the power 
to initiate it or to will it to cease when I have reason to do so. The control and 
regulation of my actions as the actions of a unified agent seem to require this. And 
surely if I have the power to initiate or to stop what I am doing, then what I am doing 
must normally be in some way accessible to me. Thus for an action to be within a 
subject's control, the subject must be capable of knowing what they are doing. And 
given the ability to ask the question 'What am I doing?' the subject's awareness of 
what they are doing must normally feed into an answer.  
 
                                                 
12 See, for example, O’Shaughnessy (1980, Vol 2, Chapter 10) and Ginet (1990, p.3). By a non-
intentional or sub-intentional action is meant not just an action which is not intended under one 
description but an action that is intentional under no description. 
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With these features of our knowledge of our action identified, I want now to explore 
some possible accounts we might give of our knowledge of actions and to sketch out 
the approach I think most promising. Some of the accounts explored do not sit well 
with the intuitively plausible features identified, and some have other shortcomings. 
However, nothing I say here about the accounts I set aside, in favour of the one I think 
most promising, will be sufficient to show that they could not be made good, or could 
not explain, or explain away, the features identified above. My hope, nevertheless, is 
that enough critical work will have been done to motivate a consideration of the 
account I think we should go for. 
3. Possible Solutions 
3.1. The Dual Component Model 
Certain theorists about belief have attempted to solve the problem of how it is that we 
have relatively a priori knowledge of our beliefs despite their relational character, by 
claiming that what we took to be a unified phenomenon is in fact a dual component 
one.13 Thus our knowledge of our beliefs on this account divides into two parts: 
knowledge of a narrow component, of which, as subjects, we have a distinctive kind 
of knowledge − knowledge by introspection, and knowledge of an external 
component not knowable by the subject in any distinctive way. The dual component 
theorist tries to explain how it is that our knowledge of our beliefs has the features it 
has, despite being relational, by adopting a dual component theory of belief and an 
account of our knowledge of each element. If this is a natural move to make in 
dealing with our knowledge of our beliefs, it is an even more natural move to make in 
dealing with our knowledge of bodily action. It has been common to think of actions 
as the combination of at least two separate components: a psychological component − 
an intention, or trying; and a non-psychological one − a movement of the body. If this 
were to be our view of actions then we could say that the features that we have taken 
to be features of our knowledge of our actions are in fact only features of our 
knowledge of our tryings or intentions. Our knowledge of our intentions is 
authoritative, a priori, and transparent, but our knowledge of our bodily movements is 
not. As Donnellan puts it:  
                                                 
13 Putnam’s original paper, Putnam (1975), suggested this move. It is also developed in McGinn 
(1982). 
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What this suggests is that our knowledge of our own intentional actions is 
complex, that it divides up, so to speak, into an element of ‘direct 
awareness’... and other elements to which observation is relevant.14
 
To try to explain the knowledge we have of our actions by claiming that it is in fact 
knowledge of two more primitive components is not, I think, the right direction to 
move in. 
 
First, such an account makes a critical part of my knowing what I am doing a matter 
of perception. Given that we have perceptual access to other's bodily movements we 
might think that it fails properly to capture the first-person/third-person asymmetry 
involved in the first-person authority we have found to be a feature of our knowledge 
of our actions. Also, such a dual component account clashes with the seeming 
aprioricity of our knowledge of our actions. The account has it that my knowledge 
that, for example, I am raising my arm depends not only upon my knowing 
immediately that I intended or am trying to raise my arm, but also upon perceptual 
information that my arm is rising. In so doing it fails to explain a feature of our 
knowledge of our actions we found plausible. Moreover, it threatens to conflict with 
the feature of relative transparency. If my knowledge of my actions depends directly 
upon a perceptual component in this way, then given the possibility for widespread 
brute error that perceptual capacities leave room for, we should expect to find such a 
possibility in the case of action. It maybe that the dual component theorist can explain 
why we must normally be able to know what we are doing despite adopting a partially 
perceptual model. They may argue that since our normal conditions for initiating 
action require information about the nature of our bodies, via perceptual feedback, 
perceptual breakdown would in fact rob me of my capacity to act, by robbing me of a 
grasp of what possible things I could do. If this were the case, there would not be the 
possibility of actions to which I was self-blind in the case of perceptual breakdown. 
However, even given perceptual breakdown, we may think that a subject would in 
fact be able to continue acting for a short time, relying on past information for a grasp 
of the possible actions it could carry out. And it is not plausible that they would be 
unknowing about such actions simply in virtue of that breakdown. The theorist might 
also have some other reason for saying that there is a conceptual dependence between 
our acting and our knowing that we are acting, so that there would be no actions in the 
                                                 
14 Donnellan (1963). 
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case of perceptual breakdown. Prima facie, however, it is hard to see what their 
reason might be. But the reason cannot be the attractive one that there is something 
about the conditions under which we act which is already apt to provide us with 
knowledge of the action.  This cannot be their reason because, on their account, to 
know what I am doing I have to wait to receive perceptual information which is not 
available at the onset of the action about what my body is doing. 
 
Second, the dual component model seems to be partly motivated by the assumption 
that an account of the knowledge we have of our intentions or tryings, an account 
which was supposed to explain the distinctive features of action self-ascription, can 
non-problematically be provided. The assumption seems to be that our intentions or 
tryings will involve no external component and will be capable of being the objects of 
direct awareness. However, first, we would need to make sense of such direct 
awareness of any supposed internal components of our actions, and, second, we have 
no good reason to think that the contents of our intentions or tryings will be any more 
independent of their relations to external elements of the environment than the 
contents of our beliefs and perceptions. It is highly plausible to think that a creature 
inhabiting an arm-free world cannot even try to raise an arm.  
 
Third, the model can seem unsatisfactory for much the same reason that a dual 
component theory of belief, and of the knowledge we have of our beliefs, has struck 
theorists who think of belief as a unified psychological state as unsatisfactory. If we 
think of actions as unified psychological phenomena, rather than aggregative 
constructions of psychological and non-psychological components, then we are not 
going to adopt the view outlined above. As I have said, I am not going to offer a 
defence of this view of actions here but merely consider what account of our 
knowledge of them will seem plausible for someone who accepts such a view. 
 
Considering how a dual component theorist will respond to the problems raised, 
brings out the fact that are in fact many different forms of dual component account. 
There are as many different forms as there are combinations of the different accounts 
one could give of the nature and knowledge of a person's knowledge of their 
intentions or tryings, on the one hand, and of nature and knowledge of the movements 
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of their body, on the other. The dual component model envisaged above is only one 
version of a dual component account. 
. 
In dealing with the first problem raised above, it is important to stress that a 
contemporary dual component account is likely to hold that our knowledge of our 
actions depends not just on our five senses, but also centrally on bodily awareness.15  
And given a view on which bodily awareness is necessarily awareness only of my 
body, there is room to say that, even in the perceptual component, there is a first/third-
person asymmetry. So, there is room to say that first person authority can be reflected 
in both components of the dual component account. However, we still have a problem 
with relative aprioricity − it will still be the case that that I need to await the 
deliverance of my perceptual capacities in order to know whether I have raised my 
arm. This has seemed to be phenomenologically counter-intuitive. It rather seems that 
my raising my arm, say, gives me ceteris parabis the knowledge that I moved my arm 
without my having to monitor feedback from bodily awareness. It has not been 
doubted that this knowledge is set against a background which makes it unnecessary 
for me to check to see whether my motor system is in working order. Or that having 
reason to think that our motor system is playing up is very likely to result in an appeal 
to the testimony of our senses to check whether we acted. Nor is it doubted that 
keeping up an accurate schema of what actions are possible, and so being able to 
continue acting at all, will require perceptual feedback on the position of my limbs 
and so on. However none of this gives us reason to think that any such feedback is 
part of my immediate grounds for my knowledge that I am raising my arm. 
 
We can imagine our dual component theorist, in response to the second problem 
raised above, rejecting the assumption that our knowledge of our intentions or tryings 
will involve direct awareness of some component, narrowly construed. What account 
the dual component theorist comes to offer of our knowledge of our intentions or 
tryings will depend on what account she thinks right for mental phenomena in 
general. So, instead of taking our knowledge of our mental states and actions to be 
due to some kind of internal perception, she might think it due to some reliable 
                                                 
15 Of course we can also come to have knowledge of the movements of our bodies from observing and 
listening to others – someone starting can tell me that I have touched them, or someone can verbally 
inform me that I have moved – but such sources are clearly not operative in the basic case. 
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mechanism. Or she might think that our intentions or tryings can function as reasons 
for their own ascription. Whatever account is adopted (and it may be an account that 
embraces an externalist individuation of intentions and tryings), it may then be 
combined with an account of our knowledge of our bodily movements, and perhaps 
our knowledge of the relation between our bodily movements and our intentions or 
tryings, to give an account of our actions. However, it needs to be noted that once the 
theorist has embraced the idea that intentions or tryings depend upon external 
elements, much of the motivation for giving an account of our knowledge of our 
actions by thinking of actions as divided into two components falls away.  
 
However, recalling the third problem, even given adaptations of the kind discussed, if 
one operates with an understanding of actions as unified phenomena, then however 
compelling in themselves the component parts of the account offered are – the 
account of our knowledge of our intentions, of our bodily movements and so on – the 
resulting account of action is unlikely to be accepted. 
 
So far we have supposed that our dual component theorist is committed to a dual 
component theory of action and, thus, to a dual component account of our knowledge 
of our actions. Might it not be possible for a theorist to meet the third problem by 
agreeing that our actions are unified psychological phenomena, but holding that our 
knowledge of them nevertheless comes in two parts? Here the suggestion would be 
that I have knowledge of my intentions or tryings, however such knowledge is 
construed, and also knowledge of my bodily movements, through bodily awareness 
and/or ordinary perception, and that these two kinds of knowledge are what enable me 
to know what I am doing. On this account my knowledge of what I am doing will be 
essentially indirect. According to this version of the dual component account, 
intending or trying is at most a necessary condition of, but not a component part of, an 
action. So, on this account my knowledge of my intending or trying is knowledge 
only of a necessary condition − perhaps of a causal antecedent of my action − not of 
my acting. And any observation of my body moving will not in itself give me 
knowledge of what is in fact my action. If we held a unified account of the nature of 
bodily action, but adopted a dual component account of our knowledge of such 
actions, we would in effect adopt an account on which our knowledge was always 
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inferred from the knowledge that necessary conditions for my acting were satisfied. 
Given the continued presence of a perceptual condition such an account would again 
conflict with the relatively a priori nature of our knowledge of our actions claimed 
above, and threaten to conflict with the transparency claim. However, identifying this 
possibility does raise the question of whether our knowledge of our actions is some 
kind of inference from knowledge of necessary conditions, combined with 
background conditions.  
 
3.2. The Inference Model 
The suggestion that we appeal to an inference to explain our knowledge of our actions 
can only be the suggestion that we make inferences about our actions from either our 
observations of our bodies or from our knowledge of the precursors of actions: 
intentions or tryings.  
 
The idea in the former case would have to be that I come to know what I am doing 
from making an inference on the basis of perceptual information, through bodily 
awareness and the other senses, about the movements of my body. It seems clear that, 
if the remarks made above against the dual component theorist's idea that part of our 
knowledge of our own actions flows from our sensory access to our bodily 
movements were well taken, then this account will also be held in doubt. It will sit 
well with neither the seeming aprioricity of our knowledge of our actions, nor with 
their relative transparency. 
 
What of the suggestion that we infer that we are acting from our knowledge that we 
are intending to act, or trying to act, together with an assumption that our motor 
systems and so on are all in working order? Well, first, it is very important to stress 
that trying, in this context, has to be understood, much like an intention, as an 
independent precursor of my actually acting. If the picture is that my trying is part of 
my action, then it would conflict with our unity thesis for actions. If the supposition is 
that my trying is my acting then, whilst there may be objections to the identification, 
the attempt to give an account of the trying would be to give an account of the action. 
Given this clarification, on this version of the inference model I have knowledge of 
my actions via direct knowledge only of my intentions or tryings and the assumption, 
say, that my motor system is in working order. Consider the account as told for 
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intentions (and given the idea of my trying as an independent precursor of my acting, 
I think that what will be true for intentions will be true for tryings).16 On this account, 
I know that I am doing ϕ indirectly as an inference from knowing that I intend to ϕ, 
and that my motor system is in working order. The first thing that strikes us about 
such an account is that it does not fit our naïve understanding of what is going on 
when we know we are acting. It does not seem to me that I know I am raising my arm 
as a result of inferring that I am from my knowing that I intend to raise my arm; it 
rather seems that I know that as a result of my raising my arm. On this account, no 
further epistemic support is given by my doing anything. Further, it seems impluasible 
that the subject need have beliefs about their motor system in order to be credited with 
knowledge of what they are doing. But even putting aside these considerations, 
without more being said, the grounds given in the account do not seem to be sufficient 
to ground knowledge that I am ϕ-ing. Maybe I usually do what I intend to do, but all 
too often, even if I could do what I intend to do, I do not. It would seem that my 
intention to ϕ, plus assumptions about my motor system working properly, may 
plausibly ground a justified hypothesis that I will ϕ, but it does not seem able to 
ground my knowledge. The above inference models do not seem easy to accept. There 
are more sophisticated variants of the latter form of the inference model. These, 
however, fall under what I call the anticipation model which will be discussed later 
on. 
 
3.3.The No-Reasons Judgemental Model17
In reviewing accounts of self-knowledge with respect to belief, Peacocke identifies 
what he terms 'no-reasons accounts'. According to no-reasons accounts, our beliefs 
about our beliefs count as knowledge although they are held on the basis of no 
reasons. In particular, the first-rder belief does not constitute, on such an account, my 
reason for my self-ascribing my belief.  
 
The simplest of such accounts has it that as a matter of fact agents like us, due to 
some internal mechanism, only self-ascribe beliefs that they actually have. Given that 
                                                 
16 If my trying to do something is not supposed identical with, or part of, my acting when successful, 
then in order to preserve the assumption that my acting is my doing something we would have to 
assume that trying is not all I have to do to act. But if we assume this, then it seems that the gap 
between tryings and actions will be much the same as that between intentions and actions. 
17 I take this description from Peacocke (1998) and (1999).  
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a self-ascription of the belief that p is a reliable indicator of a belief that p, if we 
accept reliablism about knowledge, it can be said that by such self-ascriptions agents 
like us express knowledge of their beliefs. The equivalent account for the self-
ascriptions of actions would have it that as a matter of fact we tend be reliable about 
what we are doing, due to some non-epistemic feedback mechanism, and in virtue of 
that we are capable of knowing what we are doing.  
 
Such simple reliablist accounts are acceptable to few in making the connection 
between the psychological phenomenon, and the knowing of it, an entirely brute 
connection. Such accounts tend, therefore, to be embellished in such a way that the 
relation between the phenomenon and the knowing of it is a rational relation, either 
because it is partly constitutive of the relata, or because it is taken to have some wider 
rational significance. Shoemaker argues that it is not just a matter of fact that belief 
ascriptions are authoritative, and beliefs relatively transparent, it is rather a 
conceptual, and so necessary, truth that they are. It is such a conceptual truth because 
it is partly constitutive of what it is to be a belief that a creature with the belief and 
capable of self-ascription, will normally be able to self-ascribe it. Burge argues that 
what makes the connection between our beliefs and our self-ascriptions capable of 
sustaining knowledge is the role such a connection plays in our nature as rational 
beings. He argues that our nature as critically rational subjects depends upon the 
obtaining of such a relation and takes this fact to confer a kind of external warrant for 
the self-ascription.18  
 
Similar embellishments could clearly be proposed for our account of our knowledge 
of our actions. We might take actions to be self-intimating as a matter of conceptual 
fact. So movements of our bodies that we were normally unable to self-ascribe would 
not count as actions. We might also claim that an ability to be authoritative about its 
own actions is a prerequisite for a critical agent, and take this to be sufficient to confer 
the status of knowledge on to the agent’s self-ascriptions. 
 
Whilst both suggestions have considerable plausibility about our natures as agents, the 
no-reasons theorist faces the same question in this case as he faces in the case of 
                                                 
18 See Burge (1996). 
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belief and that is: how do these truths secure knowledge for the subject when they 
might seem to suppose it? 
 
With respect to the first suggestion, we want to say that, while it may be true that 
certain processes or activities only count as actions if they are epistemically accessible 
to the subject in a certain way, this does not mitigate the need for an independent 
account of the way in which they are epistemically so accessible. With respect to the 
second, it is hard to suppose that the self-ascription counts as knowledge merely in 
virtue of the fact that we need to take it as a knowledge claim in order to consider the 
self-ascribing subject as a critical agent. The essential role played by the self-
ascription within the critical agent may confer some warrant on it. However, we 
would expect some epistemic relation to hold between the action and its self-
ascription independently of that role, and expect it to explain, at least partly, why the 
self-ascription counts as knowledgeable. That explanatory task still seems pressing.19
 
3.4. The Anticipation Model 
One obvious way to make true our beliefs about an area of which we have control, is 
to bring about what we believe rather than have our beliefs conform to the facts as 
they independently are. Our actions are, paradigmatically, an area over which we have 
control. One suggestion for why we seem to be authoritative about what we are doing, 
and why we are able to know what we are doing without any process of evidence 
gathering, is that we do what we believe we are going to do. Velleman, in his 
Practical Reflection, advances a sophisticated development of this suggestion. 
Velleman advances the basic thesis: that our knowledge of our own actions has the 
features it has because we normally do what we believe we are going to do. However, 
his account also aims to meet the question as to why we should be motivated to do 
such a thing – why do we not just wait and see what we do and form our beliefs about 
what we are doing accordingly? The answer is taken to lie in a deeply rooted desire 
for self-knowledge, in particular a desire to know what we are doing. Given a desire 
to keep up with what one is doing we will be motivated to bring it about that we 
accurately foresee what we are going to do, and that motivates us actually to do what 
                                                 
19 These are in effect Peacocke's criticisms of Shoemaker and Burge. See Peacocke (1999, Chapter 5). 
Despite this worry about Burge's account, it will be obvious that much else that is said in this paper is 
influenced by the discussion in his (1996), and also in his (1998). 
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we foresee doing. Furthermore, Velleman identifies intentions with self-fulfilling 
expectations: to form an intention is to form a belief about what I will do, that I am 
poised to make true on account of my desire to know what I am doing. Given a 
framework in which I do what I expect to do, a most effective way for me to get 
myself to do something – which is after all what an intention is – is to expect that I 
will do it. 
 
Velleman’s account has the attractive feature that it explains the transparency of our 
actions and the spontaneous, relatively a priori, nature of the knowledge we seem to 
have of them, while also allowing that the authority we have over our self-ascriptions 
is not groundless. He distinguishes between having knowledge that is adduced from 
evidence and knowledge which is supported by, though not adduced from, evidence. 
We are, on his account, justified in claiming to know what we are doing, not because 
we form the belief about what we are doing on the basis of evidence, but because we 
form the belief within a framework which we know makes the belief true. Self-
knowledge is a kind of justified invention. 
 
Before considering this account further, it is worth noting that it too has a parallel 
account in the literature on the self-ascription of belief. Accounts of belief self-
ascription that have it that the reason our self-ascriptions tend to be authoritative, 
while appearing spontaneous or groundless, is that what in part determines the beliefs 
we have is what we are inclined to self-ascribe. If our beliefs are in this way 
ascription dependent – we believe what we take ourselves to believe – then there is no 
epistemic gap between our belief that p and our taking ourselves to believe p that 
needs to be bridged by reasons or evidence.20  We need to be careful, however, to 
distinguish three distinct claims that may be conflated. First, few would doubt that our 
self-ascriptions are determinative of our beliefs merely in the sense that answering the 
question: ‘Do I believe p?’ will tell me, almost always, whether indeed I do believe p. 
This is just first-person authority. Second, few would doubt that settling an answer to 
the question: ‘Do I believe p?’ will not only tell me whether I do indeed believe p 
already, but will also settle any questions I may have of whether to believe p. As 
Evans has made clear, our procedures for determining whether we believe p are the 
                                                 
20See Wright (1989) and (1998). 
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same as the procedures for determining whether p.21 However, neither this claim, nor 
the former one, commits us to the view that my second-order beliefs, my beliefs about 
what I believe, are in any way epistemically or ontologically prior to my first-order 
beliefs. Rather, what they make clear is that our beliefs, and our beliefs about our 
beliefs, are in a kind of concord. Third, and more contentiously, in claiming that our 
belief ascriptions are determinative of our beliefs we might be saying, not just that the 
same procedures can be used to answer both questions, but rather that the process of 
determining what I believe is, in the normal case, what brings my beliefs about. This 
makes my self-ascriptions ontologically and epistemologically prior to my beliefs, 
and introduces a kind of psychological idealism in being committed to there being no 
fact of the matter about what I believe prior to my reflections explicitly about what I 
believe.22  
 
Velleman’s idea that our knowledge of our actions is somehow invented has most in 
common with the third claim identified: in both cases our self-ascriptions have the 
features they do because the self-ascriptions make the facts fit them. However, there 
are of course differences between actions and beliefs which make a significant 
difference to the acceptability of the accounts being offered. While actions are single 
occurrences that can be willed, beliefs are states which cannot. Thus, while we can 
make sense of a system that brings it about that it does ϕ, because it anticipates doing 
ϕ and desires self-knowledge, it is very much harder to make sense of a system that 
brings it about that it believes p somehow because it self-ascribes the belief p. The 
latter suggestion makes our self-ascriptions appear ungrounded and our beliefs, 
therefore, either arbitrary or a matter of will.  
 
However, even if not problematically idealist, the trouble with accounts of the sort  
Velleman proposes, is that they are – as he fully realises – bound to seem to have 
things backwards. We seem to have reasons to do things that are not grounded in 
beliefs about what we take our selves to be about to do. Indeed, we could have 
                                                 
21 Evans (1982,p.225): ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by 
putting into operation whatever procedures I have for answering the questions whether p.’ 
22 An account such as this can easily give way to a kind of psychological instrumentalism – rather than 
taking it that there really are beliefs constituted by the practices of self-ascription, we might think that 
there are only the practices of self-ascription themselves, and that the beliefs ascribed are useful 
interpretational fictions. 
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reasons to do things without any capacity for first-person higher-order beliefs. 
Further, as we noted before, looked at naïvely our beliefs about what we are doing are 
given epistemic support by what we are in fact doing. Velleman, as we have seen, is 
keen to emphasize that an account of the kind he offers does not need to hold that our 
self-ascriptions are epistemically groundless and lacking in justification. Nevertheless, 
the justification a subject has for their belief that they are doing ϕ cannot lie in the 
fact of their doing ϕ. Rather, it must lie in the fact that the belief is held in 
circumstances in which, given the subject’s desires for self-knowledge, the belief will 
ensure that they are motivated to do ϕ. While it seems right to say that such nesting of 
a belief can provide evidential support for the belief, it is hard to accept that this is the 
way epistemic support figures in the standard case. 
 
Another important cause for concern is that this account works only by assuming that 
intentions, understood as beliefs about what we are going to do, are necessary for 
action. That makes the account unusable to someone who thinks we need form no 
such belief about our future action as a result of practical reason. If we hold the 
position mooted before, that we can sometimes just act as the conclusion of a process 
of deciding how to act, then we are not going to want to hold that a belief about what 
we are going to do is necessary for our knowledge of that action. 
 
What an account such as that offered by Velleman does seem to get right, however, is 
that in cases of psychological self-knowledge, the knowledge we have of the 
phenomenon is somehow simultaneously given with its occurrence, rather than 
merely occasioned by it. As such, it seems to respect the features of our knowledge of 
our action intuitively identified. If we cannot reconcile this fact with the naïve thought 
that we know what we are doing partly because we are doing it, then we may be 
forced to adopt such an account. 
 
5. Knowledge Through Participation 
In what follows I will attempt to provide a sketch of what a more plausible account 
might look like. Let us go back to the naïve thought that our beliefs about what we are 
doing are given epistemic support by what we are in fact doing: we know what we are 
doing because we are doing it. Now let us suppose given the arguments presented 
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above, that our action cannot function in our justification for its self-ascription in 
virtue of some observation of it, or inference from its effects or causal antecedents. 
What of the possibility that the action can function unmediated as the reason for its 
own ascription?  
 
Let us then consider a view according to which we know we are acting when we are, 
because, and for the reason that we are.23  
 
Now presented merely as such, the account faces a problem. It provides us with no 
explanation of how an action, in so far as it need only be world directed, can bear any 
normative relation to our judgements about ourselves to the effect that we are acting. 
To put it simply, what is it about Smith's raising his arm that can support Smith's 
knowledge that he is raising his arm? 
 
Well, we may say at this point that it is not simply Smith's raising his arm that can 
function as the reason for Smith's self-ascription of the fact that he is raising his arm. 
Rather, it is centrally those actions Smith is consciously engaged in which stand to 
function as the reasons for their own ascription. The crucial question then becomes: 
how should we understand the sense in which the action is one that Smith is 
consciously engaged in? We might try two ways: (i) raising an arm, say, might seem 
to give us consciousness of the arm. This does not seem to help. (ii) We might take a 
conscious action to be an action that we make a judgement about. But, then we have 
gone a full circle in our explanations.  
 
Let us again pick up the suggestion of Peacocke's about how to characterize what is 
involved in the consciousness of a conscious attitude. The key suggestion made by 
Peacocke is that a state is conscious, in the relevant sense, if it occupies our attention. 
He tells us that to understand properly what is meant by a state occupying our 
attention, it is important that we distinguish it from the case of a state being the object 
of our attention. 
 
                                                 
23 The suggestion is, of course, drawn from Peacocke's (1999) account of our knowledge of our beliefs.  
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So, how are we to understand what it is for a state to occupy, without being the object 
of, our attention? Peacocke's discussion at this point does not offer a further 
explication. He identifies a number of distinct mental phenomena that can be said to 
occupy without being objects of attention − perceptions, conscious attitudes, tryings 
and actions − but does not attempt any further account.  
 
However, we clearly need more of an account, and such an account may prove to be 
easier to come by in the case of actions than in the case of Peacocke's conscious 
attitudes.24 The things that we do strike us immediately as the paradigm of things that 
occupy, without being the objects of, our attention. They are the paradigms of the 
things known by attentive engagement or participation, rather than because they 
function as the objects of some scrutiny. 
 
How then might we understand what it is for an action of mine to occupy my 
attention? That is, how should we understand what is going on when we say that an 
action is conscious in virtue of the subject's engagement with it? I am going to assume 
that dynamic entities such as actions and events have properties, and that an actions 
being conscious is a matter of the action having a certain property. I am also going to 
assume that we can make a distinction between the relational and intrinsic properties 
of an action or event. So, to take an unproblematically physical example, we would I 
think want to say of the rolling of the pink ball into the pocket of the table, that its 
'being a fast rolling' is a relatively intrinsic property of the event. On the other hand, 
its 'being a rolling which occurred after the sipping of the beer' would seem clearly to 
be a relational property of the event. It is of course hard to state any principled 
difference between relational and intrinsic properties (especially since it is likely to be 
a partly contextual matter whether a property is considered intrinsic or not). But 
roughly, in order to fix the intrinsic properties of an event, say, we need consider only 
the event itself along with standing background conditions, and can bracket other 
independent events that may be occurring. What this suggests is that, for our 
purposes, we can think of a property as an intrinsic property of an action if it is a 
genuine monadic property of the action (even if requiring relational individuation). 
                                                 
24 In fact I think that what Peacocke calls a conscious belief is in fact a kind of mental action; and that 
the account required of what enables our beliefs to function as reason for their own ascriptions will be 
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And we can think of a property as a relational property of an action if it stands to be 
analysed as a dyadic property, that is, as a relation. 
 
Keeping in mind this distinction between the intrinsic properties and the relational 
properties of a dynamic entity such as an action, and the assumption that being 
conscious is a property of an action in virtue of which it occupies our attention, we 
can ask whether such consciousness is to be understood as a relational or as an 
intrinsic property of the action. What answer we give to the question depends upon 
the model we have for what it takes for an action to occupy our attention. Let me 
consider two possible models. 
 
We might think that when we engage in an action in such a way that the action 
occupies our attention, what we have is a kind of complex action involving two more 
basic actions. First we have the action of doing ϕ and second we have the action of 
attending to doing ϕ. So our doing ϕ in a way that makes it occupy our attention is a 
matter of its having the relational property of being part of a complex action which 
involves not just a doing of ϕ but also an action of attending to a doing of ϕ. Here 
doing something consciously is a matter of its standing in a certain relation to 
something else I do. To adopt this as an account of what is involved leaves us, of 
course requiring an account of what is involved in the subject attending to doing ϕ 
where ϕ occupies attention rather than being the object of it. 
 
We might think that when we do something in a way which occupies our attention 
what we have is a single action done in a certain way. Rather than there being two 
actions, the doing of ϕ and the attending to the doing of ϕ there is rather just the one 
action; the doing of ϕ in a certain way. Here the suggestion is that for an action to be 
conscious in the sense that it can stand as the reason for its own ascription, is for it to 
have an intrinsic property. 
 
It is very natural to assume that for a mental state or activity to be conscious in a way 
that makes it accessible to its subject − for it to be conscious in a way that makes it 
                                                                                                                                            
parasitic on an account of what enables our judgements to function as the reason for their own 
ascriptions.  
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poised to stand as the reason for its own ascription − is for it to have a certain 
relational property, for it to bear a relation to some further act on the part of the 
subject. In particular, it is thought that it can only have such a property in virtue of 
some further act of attending to their actions, for example, on the part of the subject. 
This very natural thought is, in my view, a mistake (at least as far as our activities, as 
opposed to our mental states, go).25
 
Instead, I want to suggest, we should take the kind of consciousness exhibited by 
mental activities, which occupy without being object of attention and are able to stand 
as reasons for their own ascription, as intrinsic to those activities and not requiring 
any further mental act on the part of the subject. The kind of consciousness inherent in 
my actions should be thought of as a monadic property of the action rather than a 
dyadic one.  
 
However, with only this much in place we are still left with two questions: 
 
What way of acting makes an action conscious, and so occupy rather than stand as the 
object of our attention? 
 
Why should an action that occupies our attention qualify for knowledgeable self-
ascription? What grounds my taking the action I am consciously carrying out to be my 
action? 
 
What seems clear is that an adequate answer to the first question should deliver an 
answer to the second question. If an action's being conscious makes it fit to stand as 
the reason for its own self-ascription, then what it is for the action to be conscious 
should make it clear why it does ground such self-ascriptions. In essence, my 
suggestion will be that I act consciously when I engage in my action as something I 
control. Further, that engaging in an action as something I control is engaging with the 
action as my action, and so involves a primitive form of self-awareness. Because of 
this my conscious actions are apt immediately to ground self-ascriptions. 
 
                                                 
25 It is in fact my view that passive mental states such as beliefs and perceptions are only conscious in 
this sense (as opposed to being conscious in the sense of making the subject conscious of objects in the 
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Actions strike us as the paradigms of mental phenomena that can occupy or engage 
our attention without being an object of it. Quite intuitively, our actions are those 
things we know, not by observing them, or by reflecting about them, but rather by 
actively engaging in them. We, of course, carry out many actions as a matter of habit, 
or as relatively automatically and unattentively, but when we act consciously we seem 
to act with a sense of guiding our action, with a sense of control. A natural suggestion 
as to what distinguishes an action carried out in a way that occupies our attention, 
from an action carried out in a way that does not occupy our attention, is that an 
action which occupies our attention is one the agent carries out with a sense of 
control. 
 
But what is it for an agent to act with a sense of control? This is obviously a large 
question, but to act with a sense of control must, at least be, to be aware of guiding 
our actions, to experience our actions as those we initiate and those we have the 
power to stop. We can either take this kind of awareness as primitive, or attempt 
further explication. If such explication of what it is to act with a sense of control is 
available it will, I think, most likely rest on our acting with an awareness of the means 
by which we control or guide our actions. In essence, we control our actions by acting 
on the basis of an evaluation of the possibilities open to us. So, one suggestion would 
be that we experience our actions as controlled when we act on the basis of our 
evaluation of possible actions, grasped as possible. On this suggestion, to experience 
an action as controlled is for the action to be the result of a process of evaluation of 
the options available, grasped as options. Conscious bodily action would then involve 
the agent having a grasp of the possible ways that they could move their body as basic 
actions, and carrying out one action rather than another on the basis of an assessment 
of their options. The agent's grasp of which actions are available as basic actions will 
be based on a general grasp of the ways in which they can move their body, which 
itself will be based in ways that they have moved it in the past. It will also be based on 
a particular grasp of the position of their body at the time of action, which itself will 
be based on the ways in which they have most recently moved it. Let us take a case of 
an agent with only two options: suppose that an agent has just one barely functioning 
arm that they can move in just one way. If the agent grasps the two options of 'moving 
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arm up' and 'not moving arm up' as things that could be done, and acts directly on the 
basis of an assessment of these options as 'to be done' or 'not to be done', the subject 
seems to have what is needed to act with a sense of control. However, if this is what is 
involved in acting with a sense of control, then we have reason to think that acting 
with a sense of control gives us some awareness of my action as my action. It is 
certainly the case that only the agent of an action can be engaged in their action in this 
way. Only the agent of action can act immediately on the basis of an assessment of 
options. But we also have reason to attribute to the agent awareness not only of the 
action through this kind of engagement with it, but also an awareness that it is their 
action. Acting directly on the basis of an assessment of options, grasped as options, 
means I have grasped that action as an option for me. An agent may not be able to 
self-ascribe something as an option, because it may not have the requisite first-person 
concept.  However, acting directly on the basis of an assessment of whether to carry 
out an action or not, given a grasp of the choices, must either presuppose, or give me, 
a grasp of the action as an option for me. 
 
We can summarize the line of thought using the following argument: 
 
1. An agent acts with a sense of control when they carry out their action on the basis 
of an assessment of the options, grasped as options, of acting one way rather than 
another. 
2. If an agent acts directly on an assessment of the options, grasped as options, of 
acting one way rather than another, they manifest awareness of the option as an option 
for them. 
3. Therefore, acting with a sense of control is acting with self-awareness. 
 
There is of course much more to be said about how to understand these various 
claims. In particular, it would I think emerge from a proper consideration of them that 
there will be various kinds of grasp that can be attributed to a subject of their options, 
and that there will be correlated notions of self-awareness. There will be agents who 
can fully conceptualize what actions are possible as basic actions, and who deliberate 
over their reasons for acting one way rather than another. And there will be agents 
who can have only a more primitive grasp of their options and who evaluate them in 
less sophisticated terms. A creature who manifestly experiments and revises their 
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strategies for getting what they want, but who cannot be thought to fully 
conceptualize their options might fall here. There will also be agents who function as 
rational systems in such a way that it seems right to say that they in some sense act on 
the basis of an assessment of their options, but for whom we do not want to say that 
they grasp their options as options, and so who do not act with self-awareness.  
 
If the above suggestion has anything going for it, we have the beginnings of an 
account of our knowledge of our own actions. We are able to act consciously, and 
acting consciously is acting with a sense of control. Acting with a sense of control is 
acting in a certain way: it is acting directly on the basis of an evaluation of the 
possible ways of acting, understood as possible actions. Acting directly on the basis of 
an evaluation of the possible ways of acting, understood as possible actions, is acting 
with self-awareness of a primitive form. So, when my acting consciously acts as the 
reason for my self-ascription of the action, my self-ascription is knowledgeable 
because it rests on an awareness of what I am doing. 
 
I have said that acting consciously, which is acting in a certain way which grounds 
our self-ascriptions, involves a form of self-awareness. This may give rise to 
objections. It might be said that properly speaking such consciousness cannot be a 
form of self-awareness as it does not involve a capacity for first person reference.26 
Certainly if being self-aware is understood to imply a capacity for first person 
reference then this cannot be a form of self-awareness. However, it is form of 
awareness which is such that a suitably cognitively equipped subject − a subject with 
grasp of the first person and the concept of an action − will immediately be able to 
self-ascribe the action they are conscious of in this way. A form of awareness which is 
self-indicting in this way clearly needs to be distinguished both from our awareness of 
the world and things around us, an awareness that may in many cases be quite 
independent of our ability to ascribe anything to our selves, and from our self-
ascriptions themselves. I do not mind whether we call this primitive self-awareness, or 
something else. The point is the need to identify the need for and nature of the 
phenomenon. 
 
                                                 
26 This is what for example Casteneda would say.  
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By way of conclusion, let us see how the account sketched fits with the features of 
authority, relative aprioricity and transparency introduced at the beginning of the 
chapter as intuitive marks of our knowledge of our actions. 
 
Given the claim that, in central cases, it is the acting in a certain way that grounds 
ones knowledge of ones actions, we have an explanation of first-person authority. The 
agent whose conscious or engaged action stands as the reason for her self-ascription 
will be first-person authoritative over her actions. The agent of an action will know in 
a way unavailable to others whether she is acting, because only the agent acts directly 
as a result of her assessment of the possibilities available, understood as possibilities. 
Furthermore, the agent will not only in general know that she is acting when she 
knows in this way that she is acting, she will also know what she is doing. As long as 
she has no evidence to the contrary, the agent is entitled to the assumption that her 
motor systems are working properly and that she has, on the basis of past action, a 
veridical grasp of both the general and particular possible basic actions open to her. In 
bringing about a movement of her body as the direct result of an evaluation of the 
ways she might have moved it, grasped as ways she might move it, the agent can be 
said to know what she is doing. She can know what she has done in a way not 
dissimilar to the way she could know which object she has picked out if she had a 
grasp of the possible objects available and picked one, rather than another. However, 
it is however, important to emphasize a couple of points made earlier. When it is 
claimed that our actions can act as the grounds for our knowledge of them, it is not 
being claimed that there is knowledge of them under any description. So, while the 
moving of my hand may be the potting of the pink ball, my knowledge that I am so 
moving it, does not by itself give me knowledge that I am potting the pink. The claim 
of first-person authority with respect to our actions is to be understood as relative to 
certain descriptions which could be regarded as basic. Authority is also compatible 
with the possibility of mistaken basic action ascriptions, of raising my arm, for 
example. My motor system could malfunction in such a way that my arm does not 
move, or that it lowers rather than rises, or I could for one reason or another have a 
non-veridical grasp of the possible actions open to me as basic. 
 
It should by now be clear how our knowledge of our actions is being taken to be 
compatible with the feature of relative aprioricity. There is obviously a considerable 
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role that is played by our proprioceptive and other perceptual faculties in maintaining 
and updating a subject's grasp of the possible ways she can act. However, when an 
agent with a grasp of the possible actions available carries out a single basic action, 
she need not avert to the testimony of her senses to know what she is doing. While our 
perceptual faculties are clearly required to give me knowledge of the things I might 
do, they are not required to give me knowledge of which, out of the things I might do, 
I am doing. All that is required to give me knowledge of that, given the appropriate 
background, is to do it.  
 
What of relative transparency? Given that acting consciously has been understood to 
be acting on the basis of an evaluation of one's options, grasped as options, we have 
reason to think that any agent who acts while asking themselves what they are doing 
will act consciously. An agent who acts on the basis of an assessment of their options 
while considering what they are doing, will be an agent who is asking what options 
for action are being taken while assessing those options. That must mean that the 
agent acts on the basis of an assessment of their options, understood as options. Given 
that acting consciously will, in the absence of any repressive mechanisms, be 
sufficient to ground a knowledgeable self-ascription, an agent who acts, and who asks 
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